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A Comparative European View on African Integration – Why it 
has been much more difficult in Africa than in Europe1
 
Wolfgang Zank 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I compare African and European integration. Despite some 
important progress, so far African integration has not been as deep as the 
European one. Measured on the terms of intergovernmental versus supranational 
cooperation, the AU is essentially an intergovernmental arrangement, with a few 
elements which might have supranational potentialities in the future. In its 
present form, the AU is more akin to the UN that to the EU. By contrast, the EU 
is a complex set of arrangements of both intergovernmental and supranational 
character. In the broad policy fields under “pillar one”, the EU resembles 
already a federal state, with increasing tendencies in this direction. 
 
The different degree of integration has been the cause of many factors. I 
highlight here the importance of two basic conditions for substantial progress at 
supranational integration. The first one is a consensus on basic constitutional 
principles. Such a consensus was in place in Western Europe after World War II 
(democratic rule by law), whereas Africa has exhibited a broad array of 
incompatible constitutional models after independence. The second condition 
has been compatible (not identical) socio-economic systems. The Western 
European countries have been mixed economies with a public sector, but where 
economic activities were mainly coordinated by market forces. This opened the 
possibilities to use these market forces, e.g. by removing trade barriers, to 
strengthen cooperation at ground level and create pressures for further 
integration. Adherence to such a socio-economic model has also become an 
explicit criterion for EU membership. By contrast, Africa has seen all kinds of 
economic systems, centrally-planned socialist ones included. The last ones are 
incompatible with market economies. The multitude of systems has therefore 
created additional barriers for African integration. Today there is reason to be 
moderately optimistic as regards some progress at African integration. 
Democratic principles are much stronger rooted today than previously, and the 
time of sweeping social experiments seems to be over. However, in the nearer 
and mid-term perspective progress is more likely to be achievable on a sub-
continental scale; in many cases the first step must be the reconstruction of the 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at a seminar of the CCIS - Center for Comparative Integration 
Studies, Aalborg, 8 January 2007. 
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“failed state”. A further strengthening of cooperation at AU-level is conceivable, 
but it will hardly acquire supra-national characteristics for many years to come. 
 
 
Introduction: A sympathetic, but not uncritical view on African integration. 
This paper contains a “European View” because the contributor is European 
(born 1952 in Hamburg, now at Aalborg University, Denmark). Furthermore, I 
have worked predominantly with European problems, the last years mainly with 
problems of European Integration. And finally, my theoretical perspectives have 
been shaped predominantly by Western, i.e. European or North American 
thinkers. As it will become apparent, for instance functionalist types of ideas fill 
up some place in my thinking (of course not exclusively). In this perspective, as 
will be explained further below, the countries of the European Union had it 
much easier at integration than their African counterparts. The obstacles to 
African Unity have indeed been formidable. The paper concludes, however, in a 
moderately optimistic mood: The prospects of African Unity, at least in relative 
terms, have increased substantially the last years. 
 
This is an academic paper where I try to assess some developments soberly. But 
it has perhaps also an implicit normative dimension given the point that I would 
like to see more progress at African unity. Certain conditions provided, I think 
that this will be in the interest of the African peoples. And also in the interest of 
Europeans. However, these “pan-African” sympathies do not necessarily imply 
that I share all political propositions which political proponents of Pan-
Africanism have forwarded. I think, for instance, of Kwame Nkrumah. It even 
appears to me that criticism of some historical aspects of Pan-Africanism is a 
necessary condition for more real progress at African integration. 
 
The paper can also be seen as a complementary contribution to the on-going 
debate of the potentials of Civil Society on African unification.2 In fact, the 
emergence of numerous civil-society actors has already produced tangible 
political outcomes. Just to mention one example, it was due to a “spirited 
campaign” by women’s rights that the African leaders amended the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, so that the promotion of gender equality became 
added to its objectives.3 However, increasing mobilisation of civil-society actors 
alone will not in itself bring more African integration about. Some structural 
                                                          
2  See, for instance, Mammo Muchie, Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee, ’African 
Integration and civil society: The case of the African Union’, Development Research 
Series, Working Paper No. 137, Research Center on Development and International 
Relations (DIR), Aalborg University, 2006. 
3  Tieku, Thomas Kwasi, ‘Explaining the Clash and Accomodation of Interests of Major 
Actors in the Creation of the African Union’, African Affairs (2004), 103, pp. 249-267, 
esp. p. 263f. 
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conditions must also be fulfilled. It is mainly above these which this paper is 
about. I highlight in particular two types of conditions, namely consensus on 
constitutional principles and compatible (not identical) socio-economic 
structures. I do not claim that this list is already all-comprehensive.  
 
 
AU and EU compared. 
Looking from Europe towards Africa in a comparative perspective is a 
fascinating enterprise. One sees two arrangements of regional integration, the 
African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU). And these two 
arrangements share some apparent similarities of the institutional set-up. On 
both sides you find an assembly of heads of states of the member-countries, 
executive councils where ministers meet, a commission, a parliament, or an 
advisory council which unites various social groups. Of the two Unions, the 
African is roughly doubly as big as Europe’s, with 53 countries on the African 
side (all except Morocco) and 27 in the EU (2007). 850 million people live in 
the African Union, in the EU “only” 483 million. And when it comes to the area, 
the African Union dwarfs the EU (30 as opposed to 4 million square kilometres). 
 
But there are substantial differences in the institutional structures. I regard as 
particular important the degrees of intergovernmental and supranational 
arrangements, to use two concepts which have played an important role at 
analysing European integration. An integration process is called 
intergovernmental when it is mainly an institutionalised form of cooperation 
among governments, which, however, have retained full national sovereignty in 
legal terms. We talk of a supranational arrangements when the member states 
have given up (or at least “pooled”, as some prefer it) important and precisely 
defined parts of their sovereignty and transferred them to a level above them, in 
an orderly legal-constitutional way, with specifically formulated delimitations of 
competences, decision-making procedures, obligations and enforcement 
mechanism for compliance. The terms supranational and federal are related in 
my view. I propose to see the installation of supranational arrangements as small 
steps towards a federation. If these supranational forms of cooperation have 
reached such a density, that important fields of politics are to be decided on the 
supranational level, we might call the new construction a “federation”. But there 
is no consensus among scholars on how much supranationalism you need in 
order to qualify for a federation, nor which fields of policy should be covered by 
it. Traditional federations such as the USA or Germany of 1871 have transferred 
foreign and defence policy to the common supranational level. Measured on this 
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yardstick the EU is not a federation. But it is perhaps firmly on the way of 
becoming one.4
 
The African Union is essentially intergovernmental in character. Heads of state 
or government meet at least once a year at the meetings of the Assembly of the 
AU, the “supreme organ” of the AU.5 Ministers meet at the Executive Council 
on more specified issues such as foreign trade or transport, and they prepare 
materials for the Assembly of the heads of state. The ministerial meetings of the 
Executive Council get prepared by the Permanent Representatives’ Committee, 
nominated by the member states’ governments. An African Commission, located 
in Addis Ababa, is responsible for the administrative issues of the AU. A 
Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council are advisory bodies. 
There are also specialised Technical Committees. The Constitutive Act of the 
AU repeated the principle of strict non-interference into member states affairs, 
which the Organisation of African Unity formulated in 1963. However, in an 
important modification, Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU states a 
“right of the Union to intervene in a Member States pursuant a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity”. A new Peace and Security Council of the AU, with 
15 elected members, has military forces for peace keeping at its disposal, 
currently 7,000 troops in Darfur. Furthermore, all 53 members of the AU have 
adhered to the development strategy of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) which officially became recognised as an AU initiative. 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), being a part of NEPAD, will 
make the governance of African countries subject to official scrutiny – perhaps 
the most innovative part of the African reform initiatives.6  
 
The build-up and evolution of these institutions have been important 
developments and improvements, when compared with the situation of the OAU 
just a decade ago. As the European Commission observed: “Africa is on the 
move … The birth of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD, the reinforced role 
of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the emergence of a 
new generation of leaders at national level have changed Africa.”7  
                                                          
4  For a recent discussion of the EU developments in this perspective see e.g. Dosenrode, 
Søren (ed.), Approaching the European Federation, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 
2007. 
5  African Union, ’The Organs of the AU’,  http.//www.africa-union.org 
/root/au/organs/assembly_en.htm, as retrieved on 31 October 2006. 
6  Jakobeit, Cord, ’Fünf Jahre NEPAD’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 32-33/2006, pp. 21-
25, esp. p. 22. 
7  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, EU 
Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development, 
Brussels, 12.10.2005, COM (2205) 489 final, p. 2. 
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However, when measured along the scale of intergovernmental versus 
supranational, then the arrangements of the African Union, or the numerous 
Regional Economic Communities at the sub-continental level, fall into the 
category of intergovernmentalism: All member countries of the AU have 
retained their full legal sovereignty. There is no field of politics where the 
African states have explicitly transferred national sovereignty to an AU level. 
The parliament of the AU is purely advisory and has no competences to make 
laws for the continent. Nor can the commission make any decisions which bind 
the member states. In the future, the reviews of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism may well produce real political results, given the point that public 
criticism coming from Africans might have an impact on public opinion. But 
also they have no legally-binding character. Besides, although NEPAD and 
APRM were declared to be AU initiatives, participation is voluntary. A row of 
member states have abstained. 
 
The Constitutive Act is more ambiguous about the Assembly, of the heads of 
states and governments. This body can make “decisions” by a two-third 
majority. But there is virtually no sphere of politics where the member states 
have transferred sovereignty to the assembly. In other words, there is no explicit 
supranational level. This is also in line with the explicit statement of the 
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member 
states (Article 3b). No member country has signed that it would regards 
decisions of the Assembly as automatically binding, or that a regulation issued 
by the Assembly would become a law within the country.  
 
There are perhaps some elements of the AU construction which might have 
some supranational potential. An example is the above-stated Article 4(h) which 
proclaims a right of the African Union to intervene in cases of war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. This is an important political declaration, 
namely that the principle of non-interference cannot evoked any more to fend 
off criticism of serious human-rights abuses. Furthermore, whereas a military 
intervention of individual countries into other ones are to be seen as breach of 
the Constitutive Act, the union as union can legitimately intervene in cases of 
genocide and serious crimes. However, the idea that military actions are 
legitimate in these circumstances is, at least in principle, accepted in 
international law. NATO argued in a similar way in order to justify the Kosovo 
intervention in 1999. Lawyers distinguish sharply between international law and 
domestic law. International law binds governments, but it does not give direct 
rights to the citizens which they could evoke going to court. And the big 
problem with international law has usually been the lack of a strong court and 
policeman to enforce it. At the time of writing (end of 2006/beginning of 2007), 
atrocities in Darfur go on, the conflict having spread to Chad and the Central 
African Republic. And Ethiopia has intervened in Somalia, without any 
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authority given by the AU. The existence of the AU as institutionalised network 
will hopefully make it easier to find solutions for these conflicts. And the 7,000 
troops in Darfur are hopefully preventing some atrocities to happen. But until 
now, unfortunately, the declarations of the Constitutive Act have mainly 
remained declarations. We may hope that this will change in the future. 
 
Also an African Court of Justice with competencies on human-rights issues, as 
provided for in Article 18 of the Constitutive Act, would be an institution with 
supranational potentialities. But characteristically, it does not exist yet. Nor are 
there any specifications in the Constitutive Act about its competencies. I regard 
it as impossible that, say, the regime in Khartoum or the many other 
authoritarian regimes on African soil (see below) will accept to be subjected to a 
court which they cannot control. Therefore, if we ever see a court in the nearer 
future, its decisions will presumably remain in the sphere of non-binding 
declarations. These might have political effect, e.g. through their influence on 
public opinion or on foreign investment. But this would not yet be a 
supranational institution.  
 
Another element of potential supranationalism might also be seen in Article 
23(2) which states that member states who fail to comply with AU decisions 
“may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and 
communication links with other Member States, and other measures of a 
political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly”. In fact, 
Mauretania’s membership of the AU became suspended after a military coup, 
which violated the principle that changes of government have to happen in a 
constitutional way. But also this sanction mechanism does not create rights for 
the citizens. It is more a political declaration whereby African leaders declared 
that their actions against other African countries can be legitimate.  
 
The Constitutive Act envisages three financial institutions, an African 
Investment Bank, an African Monetary Fund, and an African Central Bank. 
Founding an investment bank or a monetary fund could be done on an 
intergovernmental basis; after all, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank are institutions of this kind on an almost world-wide scale. But a 
Central Bank would imply an African Monetary Union, the achievement of 
which is an explicit aim of the AU, to be realised by 2028. In fact, the envisaged 
African Economic Community shall comprise not only a common currency, but 
also a customs union and a common African market. These features would 
indeed produce a break-through to a heavy dose of supranationalism, given the 
point that a common central bank or common customs policy would imply that 
the African countries transfer substantial parts of their sovereignty to common 
African institutions. But apart from stating these aims, no progress has so far 
been achieved. 
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Basically, the African Union replicates many characteristics of the United 
Nations. In both cases, heads of governments or delegations meet and discuss. 
They all have declared their firm intention so respect Human Rights. A Security 
Council can legitimately impose sanctions, armed intervention included, against 
member states in case of grave violations of basic principles. But principles are 
formulated in rather general terms, and there is no political sphere where the 
member states explicitly have given up national sovereignty. In both cases 
general assemblies and security councils may pass resolutions, but they cannot 
pass legislation which binds the member states, and which the citizens could use 
in court. Both the UN and the AU are useful intergovernmental fora. But their 
efficiency and their ability to impose their principles are very restricted.  
 
It would be mistaken not to see the progress which the establishment of the AU 
has already meant. After all, having institutionalised forms for dialogue and 
negotiation, for surveillance, for elaborating ideas as to common initiatives, is 
very useful. And having a Commission with the explicit mandate to think on 
common African initiatives, can have real effects.  
 
Just to mention one example, the AU countries have been able to formulate a 
common position on the reform of the United Nations. Nor should the many 
political potentialities which might evolve from these foundations, e.g. the peer-
review mechanism, be neglected. Two scholars of international, in an analysis of 
the Constitutive Act and its predecessors, called the AU “a guide map of where 
Africans want to go.” 8 Guide maps can be extremely useful. But the way is still 
a long one. 
  
By comparison, the European Union contains both intergovernmental and 
supranational characteristics. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, in force since 
1993, the European Union consists of a supranational “pillar” one which 
contains the fields were integration has gone furthest, and the intergovernmental 
pillars 2 (foreign policy) and 3 (Justice and Home Affairs). To put matters a bit 
simplified9, in pillars 2 and 3 the member states have, at least in formal terms, 
retained their sovereignty. Except from some more technical matters, the 
governments of the member states can make decisions only unanimously. The 
European Court of Justice has no say, and the role of parliament and 
commission ranges from “very limited” to “non-existing”. By contrast, in the 
many policy fields under “pillar one”, for instance the Internal Market, the 
                                                          
8  Packer, Corinne A.A and Donald Rukare, ‘The New African Union and Its Constitutive 
Act’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 365-
379, esp. p. 379. 
9  There are numerous books which explain the structure of the EU in more detail, for 
instance, Hix, Simon, The Political System of the European Union, Houndsmill, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, second edition, 2005. 
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European Union resembles a federal state. There is a bi-cameral legislative 
system, consisting of the council of ministers and the European parliament. In 
some cases the council, where the governments are represented, still has to 
approve decisions unanimously. But in most fields the council can take 
decisions by Qualified Majority Voting. Procedures are complex, but the 
productivity of the system, at least if measured by the number of legislative acts, 
is rather high. Currently, the acquis communautaire, i.e. the sum of community 
law, contains some 90,000 pages. And it has direct effect, which means it gives 
immediate rights to the EU citizens; they can go to court in case these rights 
become infringed.10 That means, EU laws are not international law, but have the 
quality of federal law.11 On top of the juridical system is the European Court of 
Justice, which in numerous cases has “interfered” heavily into national affairs. It 
was also the Court of Justice which has “constitutionalized” the EU treaties 
early on, i.e. making it explicit that the treaties are above national legislation and 
even national constitutions; it is the latter ones which have to be altered if 
conflicting with the treaties. In this sense the “Constitutional Treaty”, the newest 
revision of the EU-Treaty, is a misnomer because legally the EU has a 
constitution already.12Within the area of pillar 1, the Commission has far-
reaching competences. It has an (almost) exclusive right to initiate legislation, it 
represents the EU in international negotiations (e.g. on trade agreements), and it 
can also make binding decisions in its own right (e.g. in matters of competition 
policy). 
 
There have been some slow, but systematic tendencies over time. Point one, 
unlike the African Union which counted its 53 members  already from start, or 
the OAU of 1963 which organised all independent African states at that time, 
there were only six countries13 to start the process of European integration in 
1951, when establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Thereby, on a 
very limited field, the states transferred sovereignty to a supranational body. 
Also when enlarging this scheme to a European Economic Community in 1957, 
there were still only these six countries participating. Successive rounds of 
enlargement have increased the number of members to 27 by now, and there are 
more to come, Croatia presumably being the next. But it has been a gradual 
                                                          
10  To be technically precise, EU regulations become domestic law immediately, and they 
give the citizens rights vertically, towards the national authorities, and horizontally, 
towards other citizens. But EU directives are frame legislations which have to be 
transposed into national law. The member states are obliged to do this act of national 
legislation. Directives give immediately vertical rights (obliging the authorities), but 
horizontal rights only after they have been transposed into national legislation. 
11  Haltern, Ulrich (2004), ‘Integration Through Law’, Wiener, Antje and Thomas Dietz 
(eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, pp. 177-196, esp.179-184. 
12  The Constitutional Treaty was signed in 2004, but currently is blocked after negative 
referenda in France and the Netherlands.  
13  Belgium, France, (West-) Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. 
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process from small to increasing numbers; important European countries are still 
outside, some on their own will (e.g. Switzerland). Others (e.g. Georgia or 
Ukraine) declared a wish to join, but were not accepted as potential members, at 
least not yet. 
 
Point two, the field of policies which became EU matter, has also increased 
substantially. Still in 1957 only economic problems were formally included, 
whereas foreign policy was kept outside the EU cooperation14, after 1973 not 
the least on the insistence of Great Britain. By now it is part of the EU 
cooperation (albeit mainly in an intergovernmental form). And among the fields 
which were declared to be EU matter, the supranational part has grown almost 
constantly, covering now for instance also migration policy. Also monetary 
policy is supranational by now (albeit not for all EU members), in the form of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU. Against many dire warnings, the 
arrangements of the EMU have proven stable and brought monetary stability, 
the abolition of exchange-rate volatility and, perhaps most importantly, very low 
long-term interest rates.15  
 
The EU decisions and legislations have also had a strong impact on fields which 
formally are not an EU matter. Examples are social policy, health care, or 
gender relations. For instance, the treaty provisions on free labour market 
mobility and non-discrimination, in combination with the rulings of the Court of 
Justice, have strengthened the position of Irish women considerably.16
 
Currently, the EU is in a process of “hardening” as a foreign political actor. 
Often, it has been very difficult, if not impossible, to find a common line. The 
beginning of the Iraq war in 2003 was a strong reminder of this. But on the other 
hand, the EU has been a unified actor for long on fields such as international 
trade or development aid. More recently, the EU could agree on the principles of 
several common policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, or a 
Strategy for Africa.17 And from 2003 onwards, the efforts of building EU 
military capabilities for peace-keeping missions have produced results. EU 
missions having been active in Macedonia, Bosnia, Aceh/Indonesia, and many 
other places. An EU mission played an important role in the context of securing 
peaceful elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006. Actually, the 
                                                          
14  For the sake of simplicity I use the term EU also for the time prior to 1993, although it 
became official only from the Maastricht Treaty onwards.  
15  Zank, Wolfgang, ‘EMU and the Budget: The Unusual but Rather Stable Monetary and 
Fiscal Arrangements of a Federation Sui Generis’, Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Approaching 
the European Federation?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 107-138. 
16  Pierson, Paul, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis’, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, April 1996, pp. 123-163,esp. p. 150-152. 
17  Council of the European Union, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 
Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367). 
 9
EU has proven to be a rather effective peace-keeper, given the point that it can 
combine military and civilian activities (training police forces, educate lawyers, 
etc.) as no other international organisation. Furthermore, its international role 
and reputation is much less controversial than those of the US. These were the 
reasons why the parts in the Aceh conflict in Indonesia asked the EU to overtake 
peace-keeping; not the US, seen as problematic, nor the UN, seen as inefficient.  
 
The Constitutional Treaty envisages some significant strengthening of the 
foreign policy dimension of the EU.18 It strengthens the connection between 
EU’s principles and norms and its foreign policy, thereby presumably enhancing 
the coherence and compatibility of its various actions. Furthermore, the treaty 
envisages the creation of a Foreign Minister, chairing the meetings of the 
Council Foreign Affairs Committee and being vice-chairman of the commission. 
This will presumably also improve consistency. And finally, the various 
diplomatic service institutions of the EU will be transformed into a genuine 
European foreign service. Legally, foreign policy will remain mainly 
intergovernmental because there will be no move to qualified majority voting. 
However, the supranational aspects will be strengthened, not the least because 
information gathering, analysing developments and discussing possible solutions 
will be lifted upwards. Besides, some important instruments of foreign policy 
(e.g. trade, or development aid) are already at the EU level. Currently, it does 
not seem likely that the Constitutional Treaty will be ratified in its entirety. But 
it seems very likely that substantive parts will do so, among them the foreign-
policy parts. And besides from treaty matters, there are strong factors which 
constantly press the member states to find common solutions. Among those can 
be mentioned: Energy dependence, the uneasiness which Russian policies 
create, or migration pressures out of Africa. There is a strong common 
awareness that the EU member countries are interdependent, and that on many 
fields only common solution are possible. This is not the case to the same effect 
in Africa..  
 
All in all, as regards the EU we have witnesses a heavy and constantly 
increasing dose of supranationalism; also in fields where the member states still 
are sovereign we can observe a growing coherence. Cooperation within the EU 
is thereby much more compact, much more dense and much more obliging than 
among the members of the African Union. In fact, the African Union is more 
akin to the United Nations than to the EU. 
 
 
                                                          
18  Sørensen, Knud Erik, ’The State of EU Foreign Policy – Constituting a Global Player’, 
Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Approaching the European Federation?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007, pp. 165-184, esp. p. 177f.. 
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Rational, self-interested elites and integration. 
The differences between AU and EU are no coincidence, or just due to lack of 
will. In both cases, efforts at integration have faced substantial obstacles. But in 
the African case, these obstacles have been much more difficult to surmount 
than in Europe. The optimistic part of my reasoning is that conditions for further 
progress at African unification are currently better than ever before. 
 
In order to shed some light on the formidable obstacles to African unification, 
we may start with a quote from a speech, which Julius Nyerere gave on 6 March 
1997 in Accra, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Ghana’s independence: 
19
 
Prior to the independence of Tanganyika, I had been advocating that the East 
African countries should federate and then achieve independence as a single 
political unit. I had said publicly that I was willing to delay Tanganyika’s 
independence in order to enable all the three mainland countries to achieve 
their independence together as a single federated state. I made the suggestion 
because of my fear – proved correct by later events – that it would be very 
difficult to unite our countries if we let them achieve independence separately. 
 
Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, 
seats of the United Nations, and individuals entitled to a 21-gun salute, not to 
speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers and envoys, you would have a 
whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa 
balkanised.  
 
The problem which Nyerere depicted is actually a familiar one for students of 
European integration: States being ruled by elites who behave as self-interested 
actors, and who follow their own interests (or more precisely: what they see as 
their interest), and this has been first and foremost to stay in power and being 
able to exercise it without constraints from the outside. There has been a long 
tradition in social science to take rational, self-interested actors as the starting 
point for theoretical reasoning. Social constructivists have challenged this way 
on the ground that interests are nothing which are given objectively, but depend 
on actors’ perceptions and values. I fully subscribe to this view. The analysis of 
concrete situations must necessarily imply how actors view the world, and what 
they want to achieve.  These things can vary from culture to culture, from 
situation to situation, from time to time. However, the assumption that 
politicians want to stay in power, try to enlarge this power and the resources 
under their command, and try to avoid constraints from the outside, seems to be 
fairly valid irrespective of the cultural context.  
 
                                                          
19  Nyerere, Julius, ’Without unity, there is no future for Africa’,  New African, February 
2006, pp. 20-23, esp. p. 22. 
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There has also been a long academic tradition (we might mention e.g. Max 
Weber, Rudolf Michels, Vilfredo Pareto or Gaetano Mosca) to focus on ruling, 
self-interested elites as the most important makers of policy. This is not to say 
that other actors such as social movements are of no importance. But the ruling 
elites are better organised that the population at large, and the elites command 
most resources, of power, of money, of information, of persuasion, so it is 
mainly them we have to look at, if we want to understand the outcome of 
politics. This reasoning can be applied, in principle, to oligarchic, monarchic, 
dictatorial or democratic states. In this perspective, the term “democracy”, rule 
by the people, is a misnomer: Also in democracies it is elites20 to rule. But in 
democracies – and this is surely important – the elites have to accept some 
restrictions in their behaviour. They cannot, for instance, order the police to 
arrest and shoot people. In principle there is freedom of speech and organisation. 
The access to mass media is usually very unequally distributed, the elites 
commanding the loud-speakers. But at least it is not forbidden to speak out or to 
publish your own paper. In democracies it is also possible in elections at regular 
intervals to get rid of the elite group which occupies the government offices. 
However, after an election, you may get another elite group in these offices, but 
no “rule by the people”. 
 
More specifically when it comes to processes of federation building (or 
establishing supranational structures, as in the terminology used above), it was 
in particular William Riker who placed the emphasis on the ruling elites in the 
countries in question, and their federal bargain.21 As the starting point, there are 
no proper reasons why politicians should endorse a step to a union, given the 
point that it undermines their control over their territory. Only exceptional 
conditions can motivate them to do such a move. Riker thought in the first place 
about external military or diplomatic threats which could be opposed only in 
common. Later he accepted that internal threats could create such a motive too.  
 
But as a starting point it follows from this way of reasoning: Under normal 
conditions without big threats politicians have few incentives to accept 
supranational arrangements. Even on the contrary: If some are in place, national 
leaders have an interest at demolishing them because they disturb the control of 
                                                          
20  I write ”elites”, plural”, in order to avoid the misunderstanding that the ruling elite should 
be seen as one homogeneous group. It has been matter of long controversies, whether we 
should think of one ruling class, or whether it is more appropriate to think of functionally 
distinct and competing elite groups. An interesting overview over the classical and more 
recent controversies can be found e.g. at Haralambos, Michael, Sociology. Themes and 
Perspectives, London: Bell & Hyman, 1987, pp. 107-122. 
21  A good overview over this discussion: McKay, David (1999), Federalism and European 
Union: A Political Economy Perspective, Oxford University Press, esp. p. 28f.  
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he politicians over their territory. In this light, there is nothing surprising about 
that Nyerere’s attempts at establishing an East African Federation failed.  
 
The efforts at supranational or federal arrangements were frustrated not only in 
East Africa. In West Africa prior to independence the idea of a united 
independence of five French West African territories was for some time on the 
agenda. It was destroyed mainly by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, of Ivory Coast.22 
Only a rump federation of Soudan (Mali) and Senegal saw a short existence in 
1960, to fall apart soon. And looking at the former British colonies in West 
Africa, there existed several supranational arrangements at the time of 
independence: The West African Currency Board, West African Court of 
Appeals, West African Cocoa Research Institute, West African Airways 
Cooperation.23 They soon became abolished.  
 
Interestingly, it was Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, otherwise perhaps the most 
vocal proponent of Pan-Africanism, who insisted on this. Krumah argued that 
regional arrangements were antithetical to real Pan-Africanism. Some East 
African politicians, for instance Uganda’s Milton Obote, who also participated 
in bashing existing arrangements, forwarded similar view points.24 Viewed 
against the background of European integration, Nkrumah’s and Obote’s 
argument was very strange indeed. As we have seen, in the European case, it 
was a few pioneering countries which took exactly concrete steps at integration 
on limited functional fields. They thereby paved the way to the larger and much 
closer union of today. And there have been many cases and forms of cooperation 
among European states besides the EU. Suffices perhaps to mention the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Nordic cooperation, the Benelux 
cooperation, the Council of Europe, or the Schengen cooperation (abolishing of 
border controls). Schengen became actually incorporated into the EU treaty, and 
in no case have the other forms of cooperation impeded progress of the EU.  
When Nkrumah, Obote and others demolished existing forms of cooperation, 
they thereby destroyed building blocks on which further practical unification 
could be built upon. If they said they did it in order to promote African unity, I 
see this as a rhetorical exercise, in order to re-conciliate a divisive practice with 
vocal Pan-Africanism. And their (and Houphouët-Boigny’s) practical policy can 
easily be explained in terms forwarded by e.g. Riker: National political leaders 
want to secure their undivided control over their territories. Unless exceptional 
circumstances push them to do otherwise.  
 
                                                          
22  Duffield, Ian, ‘Pan-Africanism since 1940’, Crowder, Michael (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Africa, Volume 8 from c. 1940 to c. 1975, Cambridge University Press, 1984, 
pp.95-141, esp. p. 120f.   
23  Muchie et al, p. 9. 
24  Duffie, p. 124. 
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Riker has stressed the importance of external threats. One might it perhaps 
formulate it somewhat softer: A motive to federate in order to strengthen the 
international standing of the new grouping. This type of motives, “strengthening 
Africa’s/Europe’s role in the world”, can be found in numerous speeches of 
leading politicians on both continents. But the factual outcome has been 
different. Not the least because the conditions were different. 
 
 
The condition of a constitutional basis consensus 
In fact, after the rush to independence and the consequent balkanization of 
Africa, the obstacles to African unity were formidable, much more so than in the 
European case. The African obstacles were partly rooted in social and political 
structures, partly in ideational structures. 
 
When progressing to some form of federation, one must have a common 
understanding of how the new political unit is supposed to look like.  Shall it be 
a proper federation? Or a new unitary state? Should it be based on democratic 
principles, with multi-partite elections, parliamentarism and the like, or should it 
be a one-party state? If there is no consensus as regards these elementary 
constitutional principles, intergovernmental and perhaps also some minor 
supranational arrangements are possible. But not substantial progress towards a 
federation. 
 
In Europe matters were relatively simple. All six founding members of the EU 
were stable democracies. I use the term democracy mainly as a term which 
covers a set of rules, such as free elections to representative bodies, which are 
entitled to make laws. Governments are directly or indirectly dependent on 
elections. The citizens are in principle equal in legal terms, they enjoy rights 
such as freedom of speech or of organisation, and the judiciary is independent. 
All acts of state administration must be explicitly authorised by law, and they 
are to be controlled by the courts. In 1951/57 these principles were firmly in 
place, also in Germany and Italy which had quite different political systems 
before May 1945 (but which both had long traditions of constitutional 
government prior to the advent of Fascism and Nazism). These countries could 
therefore in 1951 and 1957 build up supranational structures which were 
compatible with their own constitutional orders: The supranational level can act 
only when explicitly and specifically empowered to do so by the national 
parliaments, and also the supranational level is subject to juridical scrutiny by an 
independent judiciary. Also the laws and acts of the supranational level are 
based on an unbroken chain of democratic legitimacy. There has been a long 
debate whether the EU suffers from a “democratic deficit”, given the point that 
many decisions are taken far away from the citizens. But from a formal-legal 
point of view, there is no democratic deficit. The structures of the EU are 
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another democratic layer on top of the national democracies, constructed along 
the same basic principles as the national legal systems. 
 
The first EU enlargement of 1973 was unproblematic in this respect, given the 
point that also Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were stable 
democracies. Negotiations could be done without explicit membership criteria. 
But in April 1978, when Greece, Portugal and Spain were approaching 
membership, the European Council, i.e. the heads of states and government, 
declared that “respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership in the 
European Communities”.25 The EU leaders wanted to support democracy in 
these countries, but made it also clear that this was a non-negotiable condition. 
As the EU made clear in later enlargements, this condition must be in place 
before any negotiations about membership can begin. 
 
This insistence on democracy and human rights can be seen as stating the values 
of the EU. But it can also be seen in strictly functional terms: The EU member 
states owe their stability to the legitimacy of their democratic arrangements. By 
granting non-democratic countries membership status, they would compromise 
the democratic character of their own laws and acts, given the point that any 
member state has some influence on the others via the supranational level. And 
what about an independent judiciary as a guardian of legality? How much trust 
could the democratic member states have in the compliance of EU legislation if 
there is a non-democratic government which is not in itself under independent 
judicial and democratic scrutiny? In short, a non-democratic state would have 
destabilising effects on the EU. In this case a structural-constructivist 
explanation emphasising values and a functionalist way of reasoning are 
perfectly compatible. 
 
It is therefore excluded that e.g. Belarus in its present shape could become a 
member. No one questions that Belarus is European, but its undemocratic rule 
excludes membership.  
 
At this point we have another important difference between the EU and the AU: 
In the AU every country on the African continent is welcome, regardless of its 
constitutional characteristics. This has the advantage that the impressive number 
of 53 states could enter the list. But it constitutes also a substantial weakness 
because there is no consensus as to basic constitutional principles. It is true, the 
Constitutional Act mentions among the objectives of the African Union to 
“promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
                                                          
25  Smith, Karen E., ’The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality”, 
Cremona, Marise (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, pp. 105-140, esp. 109f. 
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governance” (Article 3g). But the rulers must have very different ideas about the 
concrete meaning of these words, given the stark differences in observable 
practices. Interestingly, being a despotic regime was no reason to be excluded 
from AU membership. But becoming one might cause problems. At least, 
Mauretania’s membership became suspended after a military coup, being an 
unconstitutional change of government. This shows that Article 3g is not just 
empty words. But a consensus in words and practical behaviour about 
democracy as a certain type of rule by law is evidently not, at least not yet, in 
place. 
 
Many African countries are in a greyzone between democracy and autocratic 
rule. To measure the exact position of a country on such a scale is difficult. 
Scholars have constructed several indices for this purpose. A detailed and 
thoroughly-constructed index, on a world-wide basis is the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI).26 34 of the 48 states south of the Sahara became 
analysed within this frame. At the beginning of 2005 there were three proper 
democracies (Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa) and ten countries which 
are democracies with only minor defects (Namibia, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, 
Mali, Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya). Democracies 
with serious defects were in place in Malawi, Uganda, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria. 
 
Eight countries became classified as autocracies or façade-democracies 
(Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Rwanda, Cameroon, Togo and Chad. 
And seven countries are failed states or post-conflict states (Angola, Somalia, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Ivory Coast and DR Congo).27 
Other studies have produced groupings which are slightly different, without, 
however, altering the picture substantially.28 As long as these conditions of 
widespread harsh deviations from democratic standards in many countries are 
not altered substantially, any attempt to construct an African Union along the 
                                                          
26  www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de. The website which gives access to the 
material contains also a very graphic and instructive transformation atlas. For a discussion 
of the index and a comparison with e.g. the Freedom House Index, see: Schmidt, Siegmar, 
‘Wie viel Demokratie gibt es in Afrika?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschicht, 32-33/2006, pp.9-
14. 
27  Schmidt, p. 13. 
28  For instance, other scholars use the term ”electoral authoritarianism”, meaning political 
regimes which have ”established the institutional façades of democracy, including regular 
multiparty elections for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh 
realities of authoritarian governance.” This characteristic can be applied, on the African 
continent, to Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guinea, Mauretania, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. Scheller, Andreas (ed.), 
Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 1 and 3. 
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lines of the EU is excluded. Or is e.g. an effective independent judiciary 
imaginable in a failed state? Or legislation with democratic legitimacy when it 
becomes written by the regime in Khartoum? 
 
Of course, democratic rule by law is not the only way how to organise a state, or 
how to organise a union of states. African states have seen many forms of 
government, for instance military rule or one-party systems. Also many Western 
observers have held the opinion that under African conditions one-party rule is 
more appropriate than Western-type democracies. And in principle, also a 
scheme of one-party rule could be extended to the African continent. This was a 
solution towards which Krumah’s thoughts seem to have converged at the end of 
this rule, not the least under the impression of his travels to the Soviet Union. 
David Rooney, in a very well-researched and often very sympathising 
biography, wrote29: A Ghananian delegation under Nkrumah went to the Soviet 
Union and visited many parts of the country, which had been poor and backward 
at the time of the 1917 revolution and which gave evidence of the remarkable 
achievements of the Soviet regime. Nkrumah also noted that the Soviets had 
welded together many people of different colour, race and tongue into a mighty 
superpower. 
 
Nkrumah had further and long discussions with both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 
and studied in detail the problems which the Soviet Union had successfully 
overcome … Nkrumah became increasingly preoccupied with the question of 
whether the Soviet system, which had achieved so much in a short time, would 
be the best example for Ghana, and indeed for the whole of Africa, to follow. He 
began to ask himself whether, with dynamic leadership, Ghana could ‘take off’ 
out of its grinding poverty, and whether the whole of Africa could be welded 
together into a proud and unified country. The Soviet Union, as he had seen, 
from Moscow to Tashkent, from the Crimea to Leningrad, had achieved this – 
so why shouldn’t Africa? 
 
In the last years of his life, in exile in Guinea, he seemed to have settled for such 
a solution, and he worked actively for it. In his Dark Days in Ghana, he wrote 
that “Africa is ripe for armed revolution … imperialism and neo-colonialism [he 
meant the existing African governments, W.Z] must be attacked … and 
protracted peoples’ wars must be fought until victory is achieved.30 In 1970, in 
his The Class Struggle in Africa, he elaborated further on this theme, where he 
described a coming African Revolution as part of the world revolutionary 
socialist process. An All African People’s Revolutionary Army would bring the 
African People’s Revolutionary Party to power by military means. The Party 
                                                          
29  Rooney, David, Kwame Nkrumah. The Political Kingdom in the Third World, London: 
I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1988, p. 177f. 
30  As quoted ibid., p. 267. 
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would be supported by an All African Trade Union Congress, so the organised 
socialist workers could forge an alliance and give leadership to the peasants.31
 
Nkrumah was not the only political leader who became seduced by Leninism, 
and not the only one to have an over-optimistic view of the achievements of the 
Soviet Union. Nor was he the only politician to whom protracted wars involving 
the civilian population were legitimate political means. My point here is not a 
critique of Nkrumah for its own sake, but to highlight the enormous differences 
which were to be found among African leaders as to basic constitutional 
principles.  
 
In the light of these differences it cannot come as a surprise that African 
unification has progressed very little for many decades. Without a basic 
consensus no constitution can be written and no agreements signed which imply 
substantial supra-nationalism. 
 
However, this reasoning on a necessary constitutional consensus can also lead to 
optimism: At least in relative terms, democracy is much more widespread than 
previously, with eleven countries on the list above being at least democracies 
with only minor defects. As to the other countries we might hope for democratic 
improvements to come, albeit perhaps only slowly. It is, of course, also 
encouraging that all AU member states have signed that the aim of the union is 
to “promote democratic principles”. There is little open opposition to the idea of 
democracy, Leninism is no serious competitor any more. And last not least, 
opinion polls show high levels of popular support for democracy.32
 
Progress at democracy is valuable in itself. But here I want to stress that it also 
improves the chances for political unity. And seen in this perspective the 
chances for more African unity are better than ever before. But the conditions 
are not yet in place, at least not on the continental scale.  
 
The condition, not of identical, but of compatible socio-economic systems 
The EU has had it easier also with respect to another condition for progress at 
integration, namely largely compatible socio-economic structures. The six 
founding countries were mixed economies of a capitalist type, i.e. private 
property was protected and the coordination of economic activities was done 
mainly through markets. These countries had also built up rather complex 
welfare-state arrangements, in order to cushion the social effects of market 
economy and competition. But the welfare state has been more a complement to 
market economy, making it socially and politically acceptable, but not replacing 
it. State property has been substantial in many sectors, e.g. railways or energy or 
                                                          
31  Ibid., p. 256f. 
32  Schmidt, op. cit., p. 13. 
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steel production. This could disturb market processes, and so could subsidies, in 
particular in agriculture. But these were more modifications of the principle of 
market economy than replacements of it. Crucially, as a basic principle people 
could choose freely in which activities to engage and where to invest their 
money. No government was entitled to impede them in this respect, safe a few 
specifically defined areas such as drugs or arms. 
 
Under these conditions, practical steps to integration were relatively easy. For 
instance, the Rome Treaty of March 1957 opened the way to a common market 
and a common agricultural policy (plus a common endeavour to exploit peaceful 
nuclear energy). In a process of twelve years all internal customs barriers were 
lifted and replaced by a common external tariff. The member countries thereby 
opened themselves to more competition from their neighbours, but they also 
gained better access to their neighbours’ markets. On balance all countries won, 
the participating economies could stand the competitive pressure and exploit the 
new opportunities. This way the EU member countries began to cooperate much 
closer at ground level. However, lifting tariff barriers was not enough in order to 
create a common market because substantial non-tariff barriers, e.g. 
incompatible technical standards and requirements, impeded the free circulation 
of goods. This problem was dealt with after 1985 when the union launched the 
project of the Internal Market. This required huge amounts of technical 
regulations which in turn were difficult to achieve if unanimity was required at 
each step. Therefore a new treaty, the Single European Act, effectively 
introduced qualified majority voting on issues pertaining to the Internal Market. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 thereafter additionally started the process 
towards a monetary union (to be achieved in 1999). 
 
Economic matters and political unification have therefore been closely 
intertwined (and they are also today). In many instances the business community 
has been pressing for more unification, e.g. prior to the start of the Internal 
Market programme. However, it was not “capitalism” which created the drive 
towards European political integration. Instead it was mainly top-politicians who 
wanted integration for political reasons and who used economic processes as 
levers. Just to give an example: Prior to the Rome Treaty in 1957, the idea of a 
customs union was highly controversial in West-Germany, with Economy 
Minister Ludwig Erhard opposing it on the grounds that Germany should orient 
herself towards the world market. However, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
insisted that closer West European integration was in Germany’s national 
interest, not the least with a view to bringing the united weight of Europe on the 
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scale when negotiating with the Soviet Union, e.g. on matters such as German 
unification.33
 
Other examples have been the programme of the Internal Market with its 
transition to majority voting and the Economic and Monetary Union, driven 
forward in particular by French politicians such as Francois Mitterand or 
Jacques Delors, in order to add more installations to the Construction 
Européenne34, primarily for political reasons. 
 
However, such an integration path by starting and deepening a common market 
can only work if certain conditions are fulfilled. Quite simple, you can only 
create a common market if you agree on the idea of a market economy. If, say, 
one country is a market economy and the neighbouring one a  centrally-planned 
economy, a common market is not possible. Then in principle only two 
outcomes are conceivable. Either, the borders become really open for economic 
transactions. But then central planning will collapse. Or tight border controls 
will be maintained and exchange will be allowed only in so far it fits to the 
previously established plan. But then you do not have a common market but 
instead two states which organise exchange on the basis of long-term trade 
agreements. Badly-functioning hybrids between these forms are possible too. 
But by definition, they are not a proper common market and can therefore not 
generate the integrating forces which the European common market did.  
 
If there is a basic consensus on open market economy, then some economic 
integration will take place by market forces, e.g. companies will exploit export 
possibilities or organise joint ventures. Processes of this kind are observable 
even when there is hardly any institutional superstructure. East Asia is a case in 
point. There intra-regional trade flows have increased substantially since the 
early 1980s.35 This could happen in spite of divergences in the constitutional 
order of these countries. But all these countries, albeit in varying degree, have 
embarked on a policy of mainly unilateral and global trade liberalisation, in 
order to gain access to the markets of advanced economies. But thereby they 
also turned open to each other, which companies and consumers could exploit. 
As a group of experts of the European Central Bank, who conducted a thorough 
peace of research on economic integration in various regions of the world, 
                                                          
33  See e.g. Adenauer’s instruction to the German cabinet ministers, 19th January 1956, 
Herbst, Ludolf, Option für den Westen: Vom Marshallplan is zum deutsch-französischen 
Vertrag, München: dtv, second edition, 1996, pp. 231-233. 
34  Dyson, Kenneth and Featherstone, Kevin (1999), The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating 
Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 71-75. 
35  European Central Bank, ‘Economic Integration in Selected Regions outside the European 
Union’, ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2004, pp. 67-84, esp. p. 72.  
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concluded: “… economic integration in East Asia can be mainly interpreted as 
the indirect result of countries pursuing compatible development goals.”36 In our 
context the key word is “compatible”. 
 
However, a deeper integration to a proper common market, i.e. without 
substantial remaining economic barriers, requires more. For instance, a common 
market will hardly be sustainable if one country has state-owned enterprises 
which receive subsidies from the state budget and which then can smash 
competitors through dumping prices. Therefore, in the EU state-owned 
enterprises are not allowed to receive state subsidies. The Commission controls 
this tightly. A common market also presupposes numerous technical controls. 
Take the example of food products. If a country opens its borders to a free 
inflow of goods from the outside, it must be reasonably sure that food imports 
are not poisonous. Or if you allow the free import of cars, you must rely on that 
the breaks of these cars work sufficiently. In other words, a system of 
commonly-agreed standards must be in place. For this reason, the EU has built 
up a very detailed system of market regulation and control. 
 
It follows out of these simple functionalist reasons that the EU has had to 
formulate also economic and administrative conditions for membership when it 
opened up for eastern enlargement. In the declaration of the Copenhagen 
Council, of June 1993, these conditions were specified as follows:  
 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. 37   
 
The countries of central and eastern Europe had to reform their economies quite 
thoroughly before they could become EU members. They also had to accept 
close scrutiny by the EU Commission which monitored these countries, and 
which also formulated the accession conditionals more specifically. For 
instance, “functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with the 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” was specified that it 
presupposed, among other things, a substantial share of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Only they could give a sufficient amount of flexibility to the 
economy. 
                                                          
36  Ibid., p. 75. 
37  Zank, Wolfgang: The Politics of Eastern Enlargement: Historical Reconstruction and 
Theoretical Conclusions, 2005 (56p). Aalborg University, European Research Unit, 38. 
Occasional Paper, p. 19 http://www2.ihis.aau.dk/eru/publications/38_Zank_2005.pdf. 
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This is not to say that EU member countries must be uniform in every aspect. 
Actually they show a high amount of diversity in many fields, from the character 
and generosity of welfare-state arrangements and health care systems over the 
school system to cultural policy. But a consensus on certain principles must 
have been in place before the EU could build such a close cooperation among 
the member states. 
 
In principle there are alternatives to the market-compatible way of creating a 
common economy, which the EU followed. Again, a centrally-planned economy 
comes to the mind. Nkrumah and others were not completely mistaken, the 
Soviet Union functioned for many decades. And as to some tasks, e.g. the mass 
production of standardized military equipment during World War II, the Soviet 
economy was actually very efficient. However, it is important to understand that 
a capitalist market system and centrally-planned socialism are two systems 
which are incompatible. Following János Kornai, the Hungarian economist who 
perhaps has shaped academic thinking on the socialist systems like no one else, I 
understand “capitalist system” here as a very broad category. Its defining 
characteristics are political power being friendly to private property, private 
property being the dominant ownership form, and coordination of economic 
activities predominantly done by markets. In this definition, both the Nordic 
welfare states or the former French system with its planification fall under this 
broad definition of “capitalism”. By contrast, a socialist system according to 
Kornai is characterised by the point that a Marxist-leninist party possesses a 
power monopoly; state ownership is dominant, and economic coordination is 
done mainly by bureaucracies.38 Both systems can work in their own way. But 
as voluminous high-quality research and a vast amount of practical experiences, 
before and after 1989, have shown: Both systems require a long set of conditions 
to be fulfilled if they are supposed to work, and there is a high degree of affinity 
among the elements of a system.39 For instance, once you make the centrally-
planned state sector the corner piece of your strategy, which should receive the 
bulk of national investment, an unregulated private sector can hardly be 
tolerated anymore. It would compete for labour force, and profits and assets 
could be brought abroad. Tight economic border controls become a necessity. 
And once market incentives are destroyed, bureaucratic instructions must 
replace them. And these instructions must be become ever more detailed. “The 
system’s internal logic propels it toward ‘perfectionism’.”40A “mix” of the 
                                                          
38 Kornai, János, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton 
University Press, 1992. A short overview over the main system characteristics: Kornai, 
János,  ‘What the Chance of System From Socialism to Capitalism Does and Does Not 
Mean’, Journal of Economic Perspectives – Volume 14, Number 1 – Winter 2000,  pp. 
27-42. 
39  As regards the elements of the socialist system, see e.g. Kornai, 1992, pp. 365-8. 
40  Ibid., p. 367. 
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systems creates only non-performing hybrids. If was, for instance, not possible 
to “reform” the eastern and central European Soviet economic systems. This has 
been tried on many occasions. You could only go on with a Soviet-type of 
system, or you could abolish it and adopt capitalist market systems.  
 
Therefore African economic unification could either progress on capitalist lines, 
understood in the very wide frame as defined here. Or along the lines of a 
socialist planned economy. But not on both simultaneously. Said differently, the 
wide disparity of economic systems in Africa, ranging from models close to the 
market systems up to numerous examples of centrally-planned socialism, 
created a new formidable obstacle to progress at African integration. Still in 
1987 seven sub-Saharan countries could be grouped as socialist systems 
(Angola, Benin, Congo [Brazzaville], Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, 
Zimbabwe).41 Other countries such as Ghana or Guinea had practised with this 
type of system before. Actually Ghana has been an instructive case early on: In 
his urge to industrialise Ghana quickly, Nkrumah placed heavy tax burdens on 
cocoa farmers and other profitable producers and spent the money on numerous 
industrial projects and state farms. In 1964 he tried to coordinate all activities 
under a Seven-Year Plan. However, these investments turned out to be financial 
sinks. In a single year, 1963, instead of producing profits, they made losses of £ 
15m, “the industrial sector rapidly became a catalogue of disasters.”42 As the 
situation deteriorated, Nkrumah imposed import controls and then price 
controls, forbade the import of “non-essentials and privileged the state-owned 
sector.  Inflation became rampant.43 A fall of cocoa prices in 1965 added to 
Ghana’s grave economic problems, but did not cause them. I find it important to 
underline in this context is that “the affinity of the elements of a socialist 
system” is traceable also here: Once the market economy was destroyed, the 
logical “way out” was to try more and more controls, including effectively 
closing the border. When Nkrumah was eventually disposed by a military coup 
in 1966, Ghana was almost completely “disunited” from the rest of Africa.44
 
 
                                                          
41  Ibid, p. 8. 
42  Rooney, p. 186f.. 
43  Ibid., p. 193. 
44  “At independence Ghana had foreign reserves worth £ 190 million, adequate 
infrastructure and an efficient government machine. When Nkrumah was overthrown, the 
country was literally bankrupt, with external debts – some, it is true, inflated by foreign 
companies – of some £ 250 million. Local food was prohibitively expensive and there was 
a chronic shortage of consumer goods turning the market women, for long powerful 
supporters, against the president. Frontiers with all Ghana’s neighbours were closed, while 
the prisons were full.” Williams, David, ‘English-Speaking West Africa’, Michael 
Crowder (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 8 from c. 1940 to c. 1975, pp. 
331-382, esp, p. 359f. 
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The current state of affairs: Reasons for moderate optimism. 
If we now leave these tragic experiences behind and look forward, we can state 
with a certain amount of optimism: The time of largely diverging experiments 
with socio-economic systems is over. Also in this respect the countries of Africa 
are much closer than before. This creates much better condition for progressing 
on the path of economic integration, and perhaps starting a virtuous cycle of 
intertwined economic and political integration.  
 
We should, however, not loose out of sight that African economic integration is 
still at its beginnings. The above-mentioned experts of the European Central 
Bank concluded in this case: “With the exception of the most southern part of 
Africa, where the regional exchange of goods and services increased quite 
substantially over the 1990s, economic integration has remained low in Sub-
Saharan Africa.”45 As in the Middle East and North Africa, the general openness 
to trade is high, but they trade little among each other. One important reason is 
the dependency, still, of many countries on few primary commodities which 
they export to the world market, but which are not in much demand at the 
neighbour. 
 
Here we can add that Western Europe has had an advantage more: Already in 
the 1950s her economies were comparatively highly developed, and this means a 
high degree of specialisation of labour and diversification of production. This in 
itself creates intertwined patterns of supply and demand which go across the 
national borders. This implies in turn a high degree of interdependency which 
creates a pressure for finding common solutions. This could often be observed in 
the course of European integration, currently for instance as regards energy 
policy. To some extent this is also already valid for e.g. East Asia, where more 
institutionalised cooperation, e.g. on monetary matters, has come on the agenda. 
But many African countries have had comparatively weakly-developed 
economies, with low degrees of specialisation of labour and diversification of 
production. Economic interdependence among them (as opposed to dependence 
on e.g. world-market prices for one particular commodity) has therefore also 
been week. 
 
Also tariff barriers still burden intra-African trade, but lowering or abolishing 
them is difficult because many governments depend on the income from them. 
One might hope that the positive economic growth which most parts of Africa 
have experienced the last years might ease this kind of problems. 
 
                                                          
45  European Central Bank, ‘Economic Integration in Selected Regions outside the European 
Union’, ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2004, pp. 67-84, esp. p. 71.  
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Numerous attempts at economic integration have been started, both at the 
continental level and at regional level. The AU has declared its intention to 
create an African Economic Community and African Monetary Union by 2028. 
Besides, there are now fourteen Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and 
three monetary unions. Most of these arrangements, however, “suffer from 
significant institutional weaknesses, which combined with governance problems 
at the country level, help to account for the low level of economic integration. In 
particular, compliance with the commitments made has remained low …”46 47 
out of 53 African Union countries are members of more than one REC, some up 
to four. This is possible, in order to take up the categories discussed before, 
because the REC are up till now purely intergovernmental, and a country can 
certainly participate in several of these deliberation fora. However, as soon as 
overlapping REC will acquire supranational qualities with e.g. binding 
legislation, the countries in question will have to make a choice. 
 
Until now, only the three monetary unions, i.e. the South African Common 
Monetary Area and the two CFA monetary unions (which have linked these 
countries in monetary terms with the French franc and now the euro) show signs 
of economic integration, “benefiting from subdued inflation as well as lower 
interest rate and inflation differentials than elsewhere in the region.”47 Would it 
be advisable to demolish the two CFA unions just because they are “relicts of 
French colonialism”? 
 
 
Summary and Perspectives. 
In the decades after independence the obstacles to progress at African 
integration have been formidable, not the least due to the diversity on basic 
constitutional principles and socio-economic characteristics. But there is reason 
for optimism because Africa seems to be much more homogeneous in these 
respects. The time of far-flung socio-economic experiments is over, and at least 
on the declamatory level democratic principles do not have serious competitors 
any more, with the exception of Islamic fundamentalism in some parts of Africa. 
Opinion polls show high levels of adherence to democratic ideals, and at least 
eleven countries can be classified as democratic, perhaps with “minor 
deficiencies.” Many authoritarian countries see at least elections, and there is 
perhaps room for hope that they progress to democracy.  
 
This said the divergences are still substantial. Too substantial actually to expect 
an evolution to supranational arrangements at continental level, leave alone the 
transformation of the AU into a federation. It will still take many years for the 
failed states to recover, and to democratise the authoritarian ones. This does not 
                                                          
46  Ibid., p. 72. 
47  Ibid. 
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preclude more cooperation on the AU level, perhaps more institutionalised 
regular deliberations, perhaps the adoption of more common positions when it 
comes to international problems, or perhaps the founding of the investment bank 
which the Constitutive Act envisages. Normatively speaking, there is no reason 
not to try to develop more cooperation within the frame of the AU. 
 
However, if the ambition is to find more obliging forms of integration, built on 
common supranational institutions, which can formulate decisions and 
regulations which are binding in practice, then the AU member countries seem 
still by far too divergent. How much compliance in practice, e.g. on trade 
rulings, can you expect in a failed state? Or when it comes to human rights: How 
much compliance can you expect in practice from a government which breaks 
them on a large scale on a daily basis? 
 
In this perspective there seems to be much more chances for real progress on the 
level of the states or groupings of states. If democratic principles are a condition 
for supranational integration, they must be properly entrenched in the individual 
countries in the first place. And democratic countries can go on and build 
democratic supranational structures on top of their domestic democracies. It 
would be a tragedy, if real progress in this sense would be once again be 
impeded and the obstruction legitimised by unrealistic continental Pan-African 
rhetorics.  
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